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"Dreadful Scenes 
of Carnage on Both Sides" 
The Strangford Files and the Eastern Crisis 
of 1821-1822 
THEOPHILUS C. PROUSIS 
Lord Strangford, an experienced diplomatic official with previous post-
ings to Portugal, Brazil, and Sweden, served as Britain's ambassador to 
the Sublime Porte from 1821 to 1824, an especially turbulent time in 
Ottoman-European encounters. As the Ottoman Empire coped with a 
series of challenges, Strangford sent hundreds of reports to the London 
Foreign Office. His correspondence detailed the state of the sultan's 
realm at a tense but pivotal moment in the Eastern Question, that pre-
carious web of European power, rivalry, and intrigue in the remarkably 
resilient Ottoman Empire, which still possessed strategic lands and 
vital waterways in the Levant, or eastern Mediterranean. Rebellion broke 
out in the Danubian principalities, the Peloponnese, and other Greek-
inhabited regions of the Ottoman Empire. War between Russia and 
Turkey loomed, largely over Ottoman actions that abrogated Russian-
Ottoman treaties. Ottoman restrictions disrupted European trade. Poli-
tics clashed with religion. Sectarian abuse and violence deepened the 
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Portrait of Percy Clinton Sidney Smythe, 6th Viscount Strangford, 1820-24. (reprinted 
with permission from the Trustees of the British Museum) 
Greek-Ottoman divide. Administrative disorder heightened public un-
certainty, government factions contested the sultan's rule, and border 
disputes sparked hostility between Turkey and Persia. 
The virtually untapped Strangford treasure trove, located in the 
National Archives, Kew, UK, provides an invaluable resource on Otto-
man domestic and foreign affairs, European interests in the Near East, 
and Greek stirrings for national independence. The Strangford files, 
much like the Dashkov papers in Russian archives, hold potential riches 
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for scholars working in Ottoman, Mediterranean, borderlands, andes-
pecially Eastern Question history. 1 Against the backdrop of an inten-
sifying crisis in the Near East, Strangford chronicled a volatile situation 
from Constantinople, the epicenter of the upheaval. The messy realities 
at the core of this unfolding cataclysm featured the escalating cycle of 
Greek-Ottoman fighting and reprisal; the Ottoman massacre of Greek 
residents on Chios; the discord among Greek rebels; the debates among 
Ottoman officials about military and administrative reform; and the 
dogged efforts of European envoys like Strangford to pacify the Greek 
uprising and reduce Russian-Ottoman tension.2 Britain's ambassador 
probed all these ramifications, along with the predictable matter of 
British trade in the troubled Levant. His communiques also recounted 
his persistent attempts to persuade the Porte to evacuate Ottoman 
troops from the Danubian principalities, to appoint new hospodars or 
governors, and to remove Ottoman impediments against Black Sea and 
Mediterranean shipping. 
Strangford's description of these topics sharpens our view of the 
complex nature of the Eastern Question in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, when the Ottoman Empire faced internal and external pressures 
spawned by war, revolt, administrative breakdown, and European 
intervention. Archives and manuscripts like the Strangford collection 
widen our approach to the Eastern Question, from a purely great-power 
military, naval, and diplomatic rivalry to a more varied and dynamic 
contest. European strategic, commercial, religious, and other objectives 
entwined with the unpredictable circumstances of the Ottoman Empire. 
By relating specific episodes of janissary unrest, Greek sedition, economic 
dislocation, and public insecurity, the writings of Strangford elucidate 
not just the overlapping problems at the crux of the Eastern Question 
but also the human element at the grassroots, institutional, and policy-
making levels of Ottoman society. Rich in texture and detail, these snap-
shots depict commercial disruption, sectarian strife, administrative 
disorder, and foreign meddling in the embattled Ottoman East. 
The Greek revolution, which erupted in the Danubian principalities 
and spread to the Morea, Attica, Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Aegean 
Archipelago, triggered an Eastern emergency with European-wide 
repercussions. The established order of legitimacy confronted the prin-
ciples of liberty and nationality, and the unrest morphed into the pro-
longed Greek conflict.3 This struggle drained Ottoman resources and 
revenues; stoked dissension among factionalized Greeks; provoked 
outside intervention that resulted in an independent Greek kingdom; 
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and inspired incendiary outbursts in Europe, Russia, and the Balkans. 
The Greek uprising also eventually led the Porte to accelerate its program 
of centralizing reforms for the purpose of modernizing the empire.4 
Already in the opening months of the disturbance, European envoys 
and consuls had to cope with the seemingly intractable realities of the 
Eastern quandary: the flare-up of sectarian strife, the dislocation of trade, 
the upsurge in piracy, and the risk of war between Russia and Turkey, 
especially after the Russian legation severed official ties with the Porte 
and left Constantinople in the summer of 1821. 
In taking measures to crush the Greek mutiny, the Porte infringed 
on specific articles in Russian-Ottoman treaties and thus antagonized 
official relations between the two empires. Reprisals against the Greeks, 
most notably the execution of Ecumenical Patriarch Grigorios V in April 
1821, breached the Porte's promise in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji 
(1774) to shelter the faith and churches of Ottoman Orthodox Chris-
tians.5 Trade obstacles seemingly contravened Russia's right of un-
impeded merchant navigation in the straits, guaranteed by Kuchuk 
Kainardji and the Treaty of Commerce (1783). The Porte's dismissal of 
the hospodars of Moldavia and W allachia, accusing them of abetting the 
agitation, undermined the sultan's imperial decree of 1802, and subse-
quent stipulations in the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), sanctioning Russian 
consent in the appointment and deposition of hospodars. Facing strong 
public clamor for intervention on behalf of persecuted Greeks, and 
despite urgent calls by high-ranking officials for military action to rectify 
broken treaties, Alexander I upheld the order of legitimacy. The tsar 
deplored the rebellion as a menace to Europe's peace and security and 
to the principles of monarchical solidarity and political stability; he also 
advocated the Porte's swift suppression of the disorders before they 
engulfed other regions. At the same time, the tsarist regime requested 
the strict observance of treaties, intent on using them as instruments for 
exerting pressure on Turkey. 
The Foreign Ministry's dual approach of censuring the revolt but 
insisting on complete compliance with treaty accords became the basis 
for Russian policy in 1821. Russia's ambassador in Constantinople, 
Grigorii Aleksandrovich Stroganov, rebuked the insurrection but remon-
strated for Orthodox brethren, protested violations of trade clauses, 
and counseled moderation and restraint in Ottoman treatment of non-
insurgent Greek Christians.6 For a host of reasons, however, the Porte 
strongly suspected Russian complicity in the turmoil: Russi,a's past 
wars against Turkey; its self-proclaimed guardianship of Orthodox 
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Christians under Ottoman rule; its generous support of Greek migra-
tion to southern Russia, in particular the distribution of land grants and 
tax exemptions to Greek settlements in recently annexed Ottoman terri-
tories; and its extensive network of Greek proteges in Black Sea and 
Aegean commerce. Furthermore, Greek merchants in Odessa partici-
pated in the national ferment that produced the Philiki Etaireia (Society 
of Friends), the secret society that launched the insurgence of 1821. 
Founded in Odessa (1814) and headquartered in Kishinev, this conspira-
torial organization recruited members and monies from Greek centers 
in Russia and came under the leadership of Alexander Ypsilanti, a 
Greek general in the Russian army and an aide-de-camp of the tsar. 
Also, Russia refused to extradite rebels who fled to Bessarabia, in par-
ticular the hospodar of Moldavia, Michael Soutso, who joined the Philiki 
Etaireia and took part in the Ypsilanti upheavaV Treaty provisos 
crumbled not just because of the\rorte's plausible, but mistaken, accu-
sations of the Russian governmeht!s entanglement in the subversion 
but also because of the outbreak of sectarian rage in Constantinople, 
Smyrna, and elsewhere. Ironically, treaties that sought to maintain 
cordial ties between Russia and Turkey and safeguard Russian activities 
in the Near East did neither. 
In an ultimatum delivered to the Porte on 6/18 July 1821, Russia 
demanded the evacuation of Ottoman troops from the Danubian princi-
palities, the restoration of damaged churches and religious properties, 
the protection of Orthodox Christians, and the guarantee of commercial 
rights. H the sultan did not accept these terms, Russia would have to offer 
asylum and assistance to all Christians subjected to "blind fanaticism."8 
The expiration of the Russian note's prescribed eight-day deadline 
without the Porte's full compliance, followed by Ambassador Stroganov' s 
departure from the Ottoman capital, severed official relations between 
Russia and Turkey, the two realms most profoundly affected by the 
uproar of 1821. Thus began a strange twilight period of no war yet no 
peace. Alexander I proved reluctant to act unilaterally without the sanc-
tion of the Concert ofEurope and dreaded the prospect of a Russian-
Turkish clash that would disrupt the status quo, incite revolts elsewhere, 
and jeopardize the balance of power in Europe. Firmly committed to 
the Concert of Europe, the tsar suspected that a J a co bin directing com-
mittee in Paris had instigated trouble in the Balkans. Yet the Eastern 
quagmire thickened, Greek-Ottoman fighting intensified, Russian-
Ottoman affairs festered, and treaty vows shattered amid war and. 
revolution in the Levant. 
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Britain remained neutral in the Greek-Ottoman feud of 1821 yet 
pursued its own strategic, political, and commercial ends. Above all, 
Foreign Secretary Castlereagh resolved to avert war between Russia 
and Turkey, to maintain the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against the 
perceived peril of Russian expansion, to extend British trade in the 
Levant, and to safeguard Britain's protectorate over the Ionian Islands.9 
All these objectives framed Lord Strangford's responses to the Eastern 
predicament. Despite his considerable skill, finesse, and energy in 
striving to calm Russian-Ottoman antagonism and to mollify the Greek 
havoc, he remains a controversial figure. As the chief representative of 
British policy in the Near East, he chided Stroganov for his harsh tone 
toward the Porte and falsely implicated several tsarist officials, including 
Russia's ambassador, in the subversive Philiki Etaireia. Yet Strangford 
worked tirelessly with his European and Ottoman counterparts to 
neutralize a dangerous situation, to shield Orthodox Christians, and to 
reestablish tranquility in Moldavia and W allachia. He became convinced 
that the Porte's timely restoration of order, most notably the safekeeping 
of sacred shrines and the evacuation of troops from the Danubian princi-
palities, would forestall Russian-Ottoman hostilities. Through steadfast 
negotiation, Strangford and his colleagues sought to prevent a great-
power war and to defuse the Greek insurgency.10 
Along with his foreboding of a Russian-Ottoman confrontation, 
Strangford registered concern over the impending danger of anti-Greek 
reprisals-what he termed "atrocious and sanguinary proceedings" 
and "a spirit of relentless fanaticism." Attacks against Greek Christian 
property and churches became all too palpable to the British envoy, 
who bemoaned "the prolongation of that system of sanguinary persecu-
tion."11 Violent incidents heightened the mood of disquiet and trepida-
tion in Constantinople, especially at European embassies, obviously 
caught off guard when the sultan ordered the execution of Constantine 
Mourousi, an Ottoman Greek who served as grand dragoman (inter-
preter or translator) of the Porte. The death of the ecumenical patriarch 
and other church hierarchs amplified the perceived sectarian character 
of the Greek-Ottoman collision.12 Strangford's dispatches portrayed an 
escalating Eastern flash point, fueled largely by the danger of partisan 
slaughter in the capital and other embattled areas. With indelible images 
and scenes, his writing evoked the religious wrath and nationalistic 
ferocity that prolonged, as well as exemplified, the Greek-Ottoman 
fight. Random and deliberate violence, retribution and excess, by both 
Greeks and Turks, took place in Moldavia, Constantinople, Smyrna, 
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Aivali, and Tripolitsa. A progression of retaliation and vengeance 
exacerbated the Eastern emergency, magnified the human cost of the 
conflict, and made diplomatic mediation all the more difficult and 
imperative. 
Perhaps the most infamous of these outrages occurred on the island 
of Chios. The Chios catastrophe epitomized both the folly and the fury 
of the Greek revolution, eliciting horrific reminders of fire and sword 
memorialized in Eugene Delacroix's edgy Massacre at Chios (1824t the 
expressive painting that inspired European sympathy and support for 
the Greek cause. Located only five miles from the Turkish mainland, 
Ottoman Chios enjoyed relative autonomy, prospered economically, 
and blossomed into a commercial hub, perhaps the richest island in the 
Aegean, perfectly situated along the main shipping routes in the Levant. 
Renowned for its physical beauty, mild climate, fertile soil, and resource-
ful population, and supposedly the birthplace of Homer, Chios featured 
merchant-funded schools and hospitals and a printing press that pro-
duced new editions of the ancient Greek classics. When a band of mis-
guided adventurers from nearby Samos landed in March 1822 and 
raised the flag of liberation, most Chiotes remained skeptical; they 
understandably feared that Samiote foolhardiness and bravado might 
jeopardize their coveted autonomy and prosperity. Cautious Chiotes 
·questioned the prospect of successful rebellion, given their island's 
proximity to Turkey and its distance from the main Greek naval base at 
Hydra. Fears became reality when the Ottoman navy approached in 
April1822. The Samiote "liberators" fled to the mountains or to their 
awaiting boats, leaving Chios to a bitter fate of plunder, savagery, and 
slavery. Ottoman regular and irregular forces exacted a terribly high 
price in retribution, looting and burning the island, slaughtering un-
armed residents, and enslaving thousands. Massacre, captivity, and 
flight greatly diminished the island's Greek population, from nearly 
12o,ooo to some 2o,oooP 
Throughout these mounting pressures during the opening two years 
of the crisis, Strangford counseled restraint and caution. He rebuffed 
Ottoman complaints that the tsarist regime stood behind the Ypsilanti 
expedition. He advised the Porte to put its trust in the tsar's revulsion 
of revolution. He protested the execution of the patriarch. And he re-
peatedly tried to assuage the anger and resentment that incited further 
atrocities by the belligerents. Far from disloyal to Stroganov, he echoed 
his Russian colleague on several crucial issues yet criticized his provoca-
tive demeanor,and language, such as Stroganov's sweeping assertion 
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that Russia had the right not just to protect the sultan's Christian subjects 
but to denounce the Ottoman Empire's existence as "incompatible with 
the stability and security of the Christian faith." 14 Although Strangford 
did not succeed in thwarting a rupture in Russian-Ottoman relations, 
he exhorted the Porte to observe the strict letter of existing treaties-
by withdrawing Ottoman troops from the Danubian principalities, 
by repairing damaged churches, and by protecting Greek Orthodox 
subjects. 
The narratives of Strangford reflect the advantages and limitations 
of primary sources written by Europeans in the Ottoman Islamic world 
in the early nineteenth century. Their commentaries conveyed con-
ventional Western views of the Ottoman Empire, perceptions that 
stigmatized the Ottoman other with occasional distortion, bias, and ex-
aggeration. Envoys and consuls-and not just British representatives-
depicted Ottoman officialdom in a mostly negative light, accenting 
episodes of oppression and abuse by pashas, janissaries, and customs 
officers. Many of these authorities, portrayed as rapacious, corrupt, and 
arbitrary, interfered in the administration of European diplomatic and 
commercial concessions-the capitulations-and thus complicated 
European-Ottoman interactions. Through their anecdotes and choice 
of words, Western records alluded to commonly accepted European 
images of the Ottoman Empire, fast approaching what became known 
as "the sick man of Europe" in Western political discourse and popular 
opinion.15 
Yet the dispatches excerpted here elucidate some of the essential 
benefits of Western firsthand testimony on the Eastern Question. Strang-
ford relied on a circle of sources, gathering intelligence from merchants, 
travelers, proteges, consuls, and dragomans; from high-ranking as well 
as regional Ottoman officials; and from other European envoys. Sifting 
through these different accounts, the ambassador chronicled what he 
deemed the most critical realities in Constantinople, the geopolitical 
heart of the Ottoman Empire, and addressed a range of topics beyond 
the political and diplomatic facets of the Eastern crisis. Moreover, given 
Strangford's access to highly placed authorities. in the central govern-
ment and their protracted deliberations, his correspondence sheds light 
on how Ottoman officialdom perceived and reacted to the Greek sedi-
tion. The very specificity and urgency of his reports deepen our under-
standing of the multiple issues, such as sectarian friction and religiously 
tinged Russian-Ottoman tension, which marked an age of upheaval in 
the Ottoman Levant. 
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Documents 
These passages introduce readers to the various concerns that not only 
preoccupied Strangford but characterized Eastern Question diplomacy 
during the Eastern crisis. Document 1 suggests the intrigue and duplicity 
that accompanied European dealings with Ottoman court favorites and 
influential advisers of the sultan. Selections 2 and 3 highlight the crux 
of Strangford's overarching task: to defuse Russian-Ottoman tension 
and avoid war between Russia and Turkey. Documents 4, 7, 8, and 10 
demonstrate the prominence of commerce in Eastern Question negotia-
tions during this troubled period, especially in view of the disruption 
of trade caused by the Greek revolt. Selections 5 and 9 deal with the 
Chios massacre, while document 6 focuses on the festering problem of 
orderly governance in the Danubian principalities. All these sources 
are located in the Foreign Office holdings of the National Archives, 
Kew (TNA F0).16 When the manuscript has a word or phrase under-
lined for emphasis, I have retained the original format. In most matters 
of wording, grammar, punctuation, and citation of numbers, I have 
retained Strangford's format, including his archaisms and inconsistent 
spellings. All explanatory material in brackets is mine. 
1. TNA FO 78/106, FF. 14-16, 
10 JANUARY 1822 (No. 3) (SECRET) 
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the possibility of influencing Halet 
Efendi, the main adviser and close confidante of Sultan Mahmud II, by 
a bribe.]l7 
Among the means which have occurred to my colleagues and to 
me, as likely to influence the Turkish policy in the present crisis, the 
employment of a sum of money has more than once been under 
consideration. 
That Halet Efendi, the sultan's sole favourite and principal adviser, 
is accessible to corruption, is as certain as that his power over his 
imperial master is unbounded. A negotiation of this nature (supposing 
it to be previously authorized by Your Lordship) would of course 
require the utmost delicacy and circumspection. But it does not appear 
to be impracticable, or unlikely to be successful. 
The fear of the janissaries is (confidentially) admitted by the Turkish 
government as a chief reason for their delay in completely evacuating 
the Principalities and in nominating the hospodars. 
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On this ground, the offer of money might be made to Halet Efendi. 
He might be told, that immediately on orders being given for the 
removal of the troops, and on the publication of a decree appointing 
the hospodars, a sum would be secretly placed in his hands, to be applied, 
at his sole discretion, to the purpose of quieting any opposition or 
discontent which those measures might excite among the janissaries. 
Halet Efendi is too wealthy to be tempted by an inconsiderable 
offer. Perhaps one thousand purses, or between twelve and thirteen 
thousand pounds sterling, though in itself, a large sum, would not be 
considered by the allied cabinets as bearing any proportion to the 
expenditure of treasure which a war between Russia and Turkey 
might hereafter impose upon the governments of Europe. 
2. TNA F078/lo6, FF. 204-12A, 
25 FEBRUARY 1822 (No. 27) 
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the British ambassador's conference 
with Ottoman ministers on the demands submitted to the Porte by the 
tsarist regime.} 
My conference with the Turkish ministers took place at the house of 
the reis efendi [Ottoman foreign minister} on Saturday the 16th instant. 
It was originally intended by the Porte that this meeting should be 
of a private and confidential character; but in consideration of the 
important interests which it involved, I requested the Turkish ministers 
to consent that it should be conducted in the most formal and official 
way .... 
Your Lordship will perceive that in the absence of any late instructions 
from His Majesty's government, I regulated my language according to 
the more recent intelligence which my colleagues had received from 
their respective courts, founded upon their knowledge of the intentions 
of Russia in case the Porte should not accede to her demands with regard 
to the Principalities. 
The intelligence thus received, left no room to doubt that a further 
resistance to the Russian demands would be followed by war; and that 
the month of March would be the term of the emperor's forbearance. 
On this point my conference principally turned -peace, and the 
active good offices of the allies for the future, in case the Divan should 
accede to the Russian propositions-war, and the cessation of all 
friendly intervention on the part of the allies if it should refuse, or 
delay to admit them. 
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In placing this alternative before the Turkish ministers, with all 
possible frankness, though at the same time, with all the conciliatory 
forms of friendship, I could hardly avoid making use of language 
which I fully expected would have been ill-received by Ottoman pride. 
But I was completely mistaken. Everything which I uttered was 
placed to its true account; the friendly part which England was acting, 
seemed to be thoroughly and gratefully felt; and on no previous occasion 
did I ever experience such marked attention -such perfect amenity-
and such invincible, I might say, such provoking good humour. It was 
difficult to avoid entertaining a suspicion that they had already made 
up their mind to grant what I demanded -that they were resolved 
to keep this determination a secret-and that they were amusing 
themselves with the anxiety and agitation under which they saw me 
evidently labouring. 
There were none of those offensive allusions, upon this occasion, 
with which the language of the Turkish ministers formerly abounded-
and no insolent reference was made to the union of the Koran and the 
sabre, or to the irresistible might of an Empire armed in defence of its 
religion. 
The result of the conference may be summed in a very few words. 
The Russian demands were admitted in the most unequivocal manner, 
and a solemn promise to execute them with the least possible delay, 
was given, together with a declaration that the Divan was seriously 
occupied in actually carrying them into effect. But no positive term for 
the accomplishment of this engagement was appointed. 
Were we to judge merely from the text of those assurances, it would 
certainly seem that little real progress had been made in the negotiation. 
But I cannot avoid thinking that I have gained much more than appears. 
on the face of the protocol. To say nothing of the tone and manner of 
the Ottoman ministers, and of the various favourable il.cdications which 
they presented, it is quite impossible for me to suppose that such 
language as that which was held to them, in the name of the king of 
England, can be altogether without effect. The confidence which this 
government places ill His Majesty, and ill the friendship of Great Britain, 
is certainly greater than that which it is disposed to shew towards any 
other of the allies; and I have every reason to hope that such full credit 
is given to us for the disinterestedness of our advice, as will ensure its 
being finally and speedily accepted. 
But I have other grounds on which to found these hopes. Private 
assurances have been repeatedly sent to me, since the day of my 
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conference, by some of the ministers with whom I am in more 
confidential relations (particularly by the kapudan pasha [grand admiral 
of the Ottoman navy]), that all matters would be settled to my 
satisfaction-but that I must allow the government to do things in 
its own way. 
J. TNA FO 78/lo6, FF. 252-55, 
25 FEBRUARY 1822 (N 0. 29) 
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the issue of direct negotiations between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire.] 
Your Lordship will perceive from the report of my last conference, 
that there is no immediate hope of inducing the Porte to accede to the 
very desirable proposition of opening a direct negotiation with Russia. 
The unconquerable feeling of Turkish pride will stand in the way of 
such an arrangement, and the pretence, that, as they were not the first 
to break the ordinary relations between the two governments, they 
are not called upon to be the first to renew them, will, I apprehend, 
be obstinately adhered to. At all times, the reluctance of the Turks 
to engage in negotiation at a distance from the seat of their own 
government, has been notorious, and I do not imagine that there is 
anything in the present question, which will induce them to relinquish 
that system of habitual distrust which characterizes them. 
If the virtual admission of most of the demands of Russia (which we 
may consider as having already taken place), and the fair and honest 
execution of those which yet remain to be fulfilled, should be considered 
by the emperor of Russia as sufficiently re-establishing the state of 
things which existed previously to the departure of his minister, it is 
only to His Imperial Majesty's magnanimity that we can look for the 
renewal of the direct official intercourse between the two governments. 
I should deceive Your Lordship were I to indicate the slightest hope 
that the first step towards it, would be taken by the Porte. But I think 
that in still further satisfaction of His Imperial Majesty's dignity, it 
would not be found impossible to procure fro:rn the Porte, if not a 
positive request, at all events, the expression of a strong wish that a 
Russian minister should be sent to Constantinople. The principal 
difficulty in the way of a negotiation to obtain such a declaration from 
the Porte, would be the individual exception with which they would 
most probably seek to accompany it, and which would (perhaps with 
reason) be considered as offensive to the emperor's dignity. 
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This government has certainly manifested oflate, a wish to have it 
generally understood that it was on the point of renewing its official 
relations with Russia, and the language now held upon this subject is 
very different from that which prevailed some time ago. There is a 
very wealthy and respectable corporation of Turkish merchants ... 
who trade with the Black Sea. These persons presented a memorial to 
the Porte on the 21st instant, respecting a valuable ship belonging to 
them, which the crew, composed of Greeks, had carried into Odessa, 
and sold to a Russian merchant there, at the beginning of the rebellion. 
The kiahya bey [Ottoman minister of the interior] told them, in reply, 
to have a little patience, and that as soon as matters were settled 
with Russia, their ship would undoubtedly be restored to them. This 
assurance not appearing to satisfy the merchants, Gianib Efendi, who 
was present (and who of all the Turkish ministers is the least likely to 
make any declaration of a pacific tendency), added -"Matters are 
now almost finally adjusted. I pledge myself that in one month, or in 
six weeks at furthest, a Russian minister will be here, and the two 
governments will be better friends than ever."-The satisfaction with 
which this intelligence was received by the public, among whom it 
was speedily circulated, must have proved to the Ottoman ministers (if 
indeed they could have had any doubt on the subject) the unpopularity 
of a Russian war, and the desire of all the wealthy and respectable 
classes for the preservation of peace with their mighty neighbour. 
4· TNA FO 78/107, FF. 142-44A, 
10 APRIL 1822 (No. 47) 
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the steps taken by the Porte to repress the 
abuses of foreign-flagged vessels.]l8 
The Turkish government continues to employ very strict measures 
to repress those abuses of foreign flags which have so long prevailed 
here, to the great disgrace of such missions as have converted them 
into a source of pecuniary profit. 
Although the right of the Porte to investigate the nationality of the 
ships which enter and depart from this harbour cannot be disputed, 
its ignorance of European forms and usages, often leads it into wrong 
modes of applying a principle, otherwise perfectly justifiable in itself. 
Frequent disputes arise in consequence between the government and 
certain of the foreign ministers-and it is to be lamented that some of 
the latter should occasionally forget that they are called upon at this 
',, 
'i•' 
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moment to watch over higher and more important interests, and 
should exhaust their time and their temper in paltry squabbles, and in 
seeking to defend cases which could not be justified according to any 
navigation code in Europe. 
The rnissions to which we are indebted for the trouble and vexations 
now imposed upon our trade, are those of Naples, Denmark, and 
Holland. The charges d'affaires of these courts have long made a public 
traffic of their national flags, which became at length so notorious as to 
rouse the attention of the Porte, and to induce her to establish a system 
of scrutiny, of which the inconveniences are general in their operation 
upon all the missions at this residence, even upon those against which 
no accusation has ever been urged. 
Nor is it only with reference to our commerce and navigation that 
we have to complain of the prejudices which the respectable part of the 
corps diplomatique now suffer in consequence of the improper behaviour 
of the three charges d'affaires already mentioned. The Porte seeks to 
retrench many of the immunities which we have enjoyed from time 
immemoriat on account of the flagrant abuse of them committed by 
some of the individuals whom we are unfortunately compelled to 
consider as our colleagues. I allude particularly to the right of importing 
wine for the use of our families. This privilege is now a daily subject of 
contention with the Porte, owing to the dishonourable conduct of 
M. Navoni, the Neapolitan agent, who has made prodigious sums of 
money by lending his name to the publicans of Per a, whom he has thus 
for several years supplied with liquors, on a fixed and most profitable 
percentage. The whole conduct of this man is a perpetual scandal-
and I speak the sentiments of every mission here, which has the 
slightest regard for its own honour, when I say that it is a disgrace to 
the court of Naples that such a person should be charged with the 
conduct of its affairs, and should be permitted to prostitute the name 
of a public minister, in such a shameful manner as we have lately 
witnessed. 
5· TNA FO 78/107, FF. 227-30, 
25 APRIL 1822 (No. 55) 
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the Ottoman attack on Chios and the 
.recapture of that island by the kapudan pasha's fleet.] 19 
The Turkish expedition against Chios has been successful. 
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We are yet without complete details of this transaction, but from 
all that can be collected, it seems to have been productive of dreadful 
scenes of carnage on both sides. 
On the first appearance of the lcapudan pasha's formidable fleet, the 
Greeks who were stationed between Chesme, on the mainland, and 
Chios (to prevent the troops assembled at the former place from crossing 
over), cut their cables, and effected their escape, leaving Chios to its 
fate. 
This circumstance enabled six thousand of the Chesme troops to 
join the lcapudan pasha, who, on the nth instant proceeded to summon 
the insurgents to surrender, offering pardon to all who should lay 
down their arms, and giving them eight hours to consider ... his 
proposals. 
The insurgents rejected this offer-and instantly attempted to carry 
the castle by escalade, thinking that they could effect that object, and 
secure themselves in the fortress before the lcapudan pasha could have 
time to disembark his troops. In this they were mistaken -they were 
vigorously repulsed by the garrison, and in the meanwhile, the /capudan 
pasha landing about nine thousand men, and the former making a 
sortie, they were enclosed between two fires; lost all their artillery, 
amounting to twenty pieces, which was speedily turned against them, 
and after a short and most bloody resistance, took to flight, and were 
pursued in all directions. It is said that the loss on both sides amounts 
to fifteen thousand men. No quarter was given after the action. Every 
person taken with arms in his hands was instantly put to death. The 
women and children have been thrown into slavery. Previously to the 
action, and on the first appearance of the fleet, the Catholic inhabitants 
had shut themselves up in their convent. They have been protected by 
the lcapudan pasha, who has stationed a guard for their security, and 
who has received numbers of them on board of his fleet, where they 
are treated with the utmost kindness. The Catholic Greeks have, as 
Your Lordship is aware, never taken any part in the insurrection, and, 
as well at Chios, as in all the other islands, have constantly maintained 
their allegiance to the sultan. 
The lcapudan pasha has left a considerable body of troops on the island, 
who will, I fear, pursue the work of destruction to the very utmost. The 
Sarniote Greeks, whose unfortunate expedition to Chios has been the 
cause of the calamity which has overwhelmed that once happy and 
flourishing island, took no part in the combat, and basely fled to Psara, 
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hastily embarking on the side opposite to that where the Turkish 
troops landed. 
The kapudan pasha is said to have proceeded to the Morea, with the 
intention of attacking some of the insurgent islands in his way. 
I have the honour to enclose a translation of the placard which 
accompanied the exhibition of heads, standards, and other trophies, 
sent to the Porte by V ahid Pasha, the governor of Chios. 
6. TNA FO 78/1o8, FF. 50-59, 
10 MAY 1822 (No. 70) 
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the nomination of the new hospodars 
and the proposed changes in the administration of the Danubian 
principalities. ]2° 
At the council held on Monday, ... [the] question of nominating the 
new princes [hospodars ], and of choosing them from among the native 
boyars, was proposed to the ustaas [officers] of the janissaries who 
were present, and unanimously approved. The slight offered to the 
Greek nation by this selection, has more than any other cause, induced 
the janissaries to approve of the nomination of princes being carried 
into effect. Had the choice of the government fallen upon Greeks, I am 
convinced that the janissaries would have resisted to the very utmost. 
In truth, the policy of the Porte seems now to be decided; and its 
resolution to reduce the Greek nation to a state of absolute nullity, may 
be considered as irrevocably fixed. That imperium in imperio [empire 
within an empire, or state within a state] which had made such silent 
but rapid progress during the last thirty years, will exist no longer. The 
great source of Greek influence, and with it, of that hitherto exercised 
by Russia, will now be cut off, by the employment of Turkish subjects 
as the future dragomans of the Porte, and by the selection of natives to 
govern the two Principalities. Some observations which were lately 
made to me on this subject by one of the most intelligent Turks I have 
hitherto known, are perhaps not unworthy of Your Lordship's attention. 
"What has Russia gained," he asked, "by precipitating the Greek 
affair? For that it originated in the hopes held out by her ministers at 
St. Petersburg, and her agents in Turkey, no man who has his eyes and 
ears, can for a moment doubt. However, praise be to God, that she 
acted as she did. But for the conduct of her consuls in the Archipelago, 
and the intemperance of her minister here, in hurrying matters to an 
extremity, we should have gone on in a false and fatal security. The 
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Greeks would have, slowly perhaps, but surely, appropriated to 
themselves, the entire government of this Empire. In commerce and 
in affairs of state, they were already all powerful, and nobody among 
us had begun to suspect the gradual encrease of their influence. Had 
this state of things gone on for thirty years more, we should have been 
lost. Russia has done us a great service without intending it. She held 
a lever in her hands, with which she could at any time, have shaken 
this Empire to the foundation. It is now broken. She has (also without 
meaning it) rendered us another service. The powers of Europe have 
taught her, that she cannot make war upon us under flimsy pretences. 
I was in the ministry when the Holy Alliance was proclaimed; and when 
all my colleagues were frightened by it, I said, that if the sovereigns of 
Europe acted up to their word, the Holy Alliance would, one day, be 
our barrier against Russia. If I am not now in the ministry, it is owing 
to what I then said, and to the indignation with which it was received. 
But I was in the right. Had it not been for that alliance, which has now 
proved to Russia that she is but .Qllg, and the other states of Europe are 
many, we should have ere now been fighting against Russia for the 
possession of Constantinople. This result was not foreseen by Stroganoff 
[Stroganov] when he sought to excite his government against us. The 
Russian influence here is no more. She will again seek to exert it, under 
·pretence of settling the affairs of the Principalities, and of restoring to 
them the blessings of peace and good order. But we mean to deprive 
her of this pretence. We shall anticipate her, by our new arrangements 
for the relief of W allachia and Moldavia; and when her minister returns 
here, he will find that everything is done, and that he has no excuse for 
meddling in our affairs." 
Your Lordship may depend upon the fidelity with which the above 
observations are reported. 
. 7· TNA FO 78/108, FF. 167-69A, 
10 JUNE 1822 (No. 85) 
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the British embassy's successful resistance 
against the Porte's endeavor to search British ships in the harbor of 
Constantinople.] 
Your Lordship is aware that many of the most essential of our 
commercial privileges here, do not depend upon the positive letter 
of our treaties with the Porte, but are derived from the stipulations 
of those subsisting between Turkey and Russia, inasmuch as the 
90 THEOPHILUS C. PROUSIS 
arrangement concluded in 1802, placed us upon the footing of the most 
favoured nation. 
Whatever advantages therefore are accorded to Russia by treaty, 
we have a right to claim, even though they should not be specifically 
provided for in our own capitulations.21 
Among the new arrangements established by the Porte for the 
purpose of preventing the abuses in foreign navigation which have 
been detected here, is the practice of causing ships to be visited at the 
moment of their departure, by the officers of the Porte, in order to 
ascertain whether the cargoes correspond with the manifests. 
This new regulation has hitherto been exercised with great severity, 
and has been the subject of loud and violent complaints on the part of 
the foreign merchants. 
By the 55th Article of our capitulations, the right of the Porte to 
make this visit or search on board of our ships is clearly admitted. But 
on the other hand, in her treaty with Russia, this right is as positively 
abrogated, as far as the navigation of that power is concerned. 
Conceiving that we are entitled, in virtue of the arrangement of 1802 
to every advantage possessed by Russia, I have strenuously resisted 
the claim set up by the Porte, to examine our ships, demanding for 
them, the same exemption which is accorded to those of Russia. 
This attempt on my part was attended with considerable difficulty, 
as all the other missions here had yielded to the pretensions of the 
Porte, and had admitted her right of searching the ships of their 
respective nations. 
I will not trouble Your Lordship with the details of a negotiation, 
which has occupied me almost incessantly for the last three weeks, 
and I confine myself to a communication of its successful result, as 
announced in the accompanying official report from my first dragoman 
[Francis Chabert]. 
The British navigation in this port is now placed upon a footing 
quite distinct as far as relates to the right of search, from that of any 
other nation. I am very unwilling that we should be exposed to the 
jealousy likely to arise from this circumstance, but as one of my first 
duties here is to assist our commerce, I cannot think that I ought to reject 
any exemption from inconvenience which I may be able to procure for 
it, from a principle of delicacy, because other missions may not have 
succeeded in obtaining it for their respective countries. If it were [a] 
question of any positive and exclusive favour to our commerce, I 
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certainly should not think it worth being purchased at the price of the 
discontent of my colleagues, but as the present arrangement relates 
merely to relief from a great and serious inconvenience, I conceive that 
I am bound to do all that I can in behalf of my countrymen, without 
any tenderness for the jealous feelings of merchants belonging to other 
nations. 
8. TNA FO 78/108, FF. 261-64, 
25 JUNE 1822 (No. 97). 
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: the reis efendi's confidential proposal on 
commercial matters.] 
I have the honour to transmit a copy of an unexpected communication 
which has been made to me by the reis efendi. 
After stating that the restrictive measures which have lately been 
adopted by this government with regard to foreign commerce, are 
aimed prospectively at Russia, and destined to prevent the navigation 
of the Greeks from being carried on almost exclusively under the flag 
of that country-and after renewing his promise that the British trade 
should continue to be exempted from the effects of the new regulations, 
the reis efendi expresses the wish of this government that the commerce 
· of its reaya [tax-paying Orthodox Christian] subjects, hitherto conducted 
under Russian protection, should be transferred to Great Britain. He 
adds to this (sufficiently obscure) proposal, a request that I would 
concert with him as to the means of carrying the dispositions of the 
Porte into effect, in such a way as to be reciprocally beneficial to England 
and to Turkey. 
Even were this overture likely to be advantageous to our commerce 
and navigation (which it certainly is not), I am persuaded that Your 
Lordship would not conceive the present to be a proper moment for 
accepting from the Porte any invidious distinction in our favour. 
But while I act in conformity to what I presume will be Your 
Lordship's opinion, by declining to avail myself of the reis efendi's 
proposition, I feel persuaded that I am not sacrificing any real advantage 
to the commercial interests of His Majesty's subjects. Their navigation 
does not require any new stipulations to support it, for the political 
circumstances of this Empire have, of themselves, been sufficient to 
place it in a more flourishing condition, and to give it a greater extension 
[than] it ever before possessed. The Greek carrying trade is extinct, or 
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more properly, the greater part of it is now lodged in our hands or in 
those of the Ionians. It seems therefore better to leave matters as they 
are, and to suffer our commerce to profit by the natural course of 
events, without seeking to foster it by new arrangements between the 
two governments. 
In this opinion, I have desired M. Chabert to thank the reis efendi for 
his communication; adding, however, that it was only valuable to me 
as a mark of His Excellency's confidence and of his good-will towards 
the nation with whose interests I am charged-but that I did not see 
how the proposal which he had made to me, could be turned to the 
advantage of either country. I observed, moreover, that discovering in 
this overture a sincere proof of his desire to favour our commerce, it 
would encourage me, when a proper opportunity occurred, not to 
make new demands in behalf of it, but to invite him to define and settle 
certain rights (with reference in particular to our Black Sea trade) to 
which we had an undoubted claim, but which had either lapsed into 
oblivion, or had never hitherto been recognized with sufficient precision 
by the Ottoman government. 
9· TNA FO 78/108, FF. 303-07, 
26 JUNE 1822 (No. 101) 
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: naval clashes off Chios between Greek 
and Ottoman ships.] 
The [Austrian] internuncio [Rudolf von Liitzow] having delayed 
the departure of the post until this day, I am enabled to have the honour 
of reporting to Your Lordship that most unwelcome and disastrous 
intelligence has arrived from the Turkish fleet before Chios. 
On the night of Wednesday last, the Greeks attacked the kapudan 
pasha's vessel (a three-decker) and two other ships of the line, with 
their fire ships. The crews of the two smaller vessels of the line succeeded 
in extinguishing the flames, but the admiral's ship was blown up, and 
the kapudan pasha perished, together with all his officers and crew. The 
body of the kapudan pasha was picked up, floating on the sea, and was 
interred at Chios on the following day. 
I sent M. Chabert to the Porte early this morning, to ascertain from 
the reis efendi the truth of this intelligence, a rumour of which had 
reached me last night, but in such a vague manner that I did not report 
it in my dispatches to Your Lordship. The reis efendi fully confirmed the 
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particulars which I have related as above; and though deeply affected 
with the disgrace thus brought upon the Ottoman arms, endeavoured 
to assume an appearance of the utmost indifference. 
The loss of the finest and largest vessel in the Turkish fleet, and of 
the only commander of any skill in naval matters whom this government 
possessed, must undoubtedly be a cause of the greatest mortification 
to the Porte-while it will proportionally augment the audacity of 
the Greeks. I dread the exasperating effect which this affair may have 
on the public mind at Constantinople and Smyrna, and still more 
those measures of barbarous policy to which this government will too 
probably have recourse for the sake of calming it. Nor can I look without 
apprehension to the unfavourable influence which this disaster may 
have on the progress of the negotiation, which I had flattered myself 
was so near to a successful tennination. 
10. TNA FO 78/110, FF. 18'--25, 
3 SEPTEMBER 1822 (No. 145) 
[Strangford to Castlereagh re: Russia's demand for the retraction of 
Ottoman regulations on navigation in the Black Sea.] 
It appears that the Russian government has invited the British and 
Austrian missions at St. Petersburg to propose to the internuncio and 
to me, the employment of our joint efforts for the purpose of procuring 
from the Porte the abrogation of the system on which she is now acting 
with respect to foreign navigation. 
The Russian government, while it admits that these regulations 
are justified by the enormous abuses which have been cominitted 
here, and that they contain nothing contrary to treaty, discovers in 
them, notwithstanding, a clear indication of an unfriendly if not a 
decidedly hostile disposition towards Russia, on the part of the Turkish 
government. 
The regulations of the Porte respect those nations which have not 
acquired by treaty the right to navigate in the Black Sea. The Turkish 
ministers say that this privilege was granted to those nations who 
enjoy it, either in consequence of a war, at the end of which the Porte 
yielded it, or of some amicable negotiation at which an equivalent for 
it was granted by the other contracting party -that the Porte is ready 
to concede the navigation of the Black Sea to those powers who are 
willing to negotiate, and to grant a fair compensation for it in some 
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shape or other, but that she will not suffer those powers to defraud the 
interests of the Porte, by surreptitiously availing themselves of an 
advantage for which other states have been content to pay. 
This is the principle on which the Porte is now acting. Its attention 
to the question of foreign navigation, has been provoked by the 
multiplied and scandalous abuses of foreign flags which have prevailed 
in the chanceries of the Dutch, Danish, and Neapolitan missions-
abuses, which I am obliged to say, have been equally injurious to the 
interests of the Porte and disgraceful to the legations which have 
practised them. 
That Russia in particular has no just ground of complaint against 
these regulations, may be inferred both from the fact that since the 
departure of her minister, the navigation of bona fide Russian vessels 
has been constantly respected, and has never been interrupted, but 
also from the indulgence which the Porte, in the very face of those 
regulations, has extended to vessels which have no right to be 
considered as Russian. In August last, a number of Genoese and 
Sardinian vessels arrived here under the Russian flag, with the intention 
of proceeding to the Black Sea. Their owners being apprehensive of a 
Russian war, changed their flag for that of France, which M. de Viella, 
the French charge d'affaires, accorded to them. Under that flag they 
accordingly proceeded to the Black Sea; on their return from which, 
every one of them, on their arrival at Constantinople, was permitted 
by this government to resume the Russian flag, under which they had 
originally sailed, and to which they were in point of strict right, as little 
entitled as to that of France, or of any other country excepttheir own. 
I do not therefore perceive on what ground Russia is (at least for 
the present) justified in complaining against the new regulations of the 
Porte; nor how I can charge myself with the office of supporting these 
complaints. 
But there is, moreover, another consideration of which, as long as it 
shall be my first duty to watch over British interests, I must not permit 
myself to lose sight. The restrictions of the Porte with respect to the 
navigation of other countries, have produced such a sudden and 
extensive effect in favour of that of Great Britain, and the British shipping 
interests in the Levant have been so greatly benefitted by their operation, 
and by the exclusion of, what may be termed interlopers, from the trade 
of the Black Sea, that I can hardly venture to do anything which may 
disturb the progress of these advantages, without Your Lordship's 
express commands. 
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